

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04223 031732Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6846

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

:AMEMBASSY LONDON 6024

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USUN NEW YORK 590

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 4223

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: CCD; INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST

1. AT LUNCH WHICH INDIAN AMBASSADOR MISHRA GAVE
HERE ON JULY 3 FOR SARDAR SWARAN SIGH, INDIAN
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND WHICH WAS
ATTENDED BY AMB. MARTIN (US CCD REP), THERE WAS AN
EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THE INDIAN EXPLOSION OF A
NUCLEAR DEVICE. AMBASSADOR HAINWORTH (UK) ASKED
IF THE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS THAT INDIA HAD WITH
OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD PREVENT INDIA FROM EXPORTING
THE TECHNOLOGY FOR EXPLODING A NUCLEAR DEVICE TO
COUNTRIES WHICH DID NOT HAVE THIS TYPE OF EXPERTISE.
SWARAN SINGH SAID THAT THE AGREEMENTS ALL SPOKE IN
TERMS OF WHAT COULD BE DONE RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04223 031732Z

PROHIBITION. (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT INDIA MIGHT

EXPORT SUCH TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE TREATIES.) HAINWORTH PRESSED THE MINISTER ON THIS POINT AND IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION AS TO WHETHER INDIA WOULD REFUSE TO EXPORT THIS TECHNOLOGY, SWARAN SINGH SAID "VERY MUCH SO". AMB MARTIN WAS SEATED NEXT TO AMB MISHRA AND THE LATTER SEEMED QUITE PLEASED BY HIS MINISTER'S REPLY AND REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE SHOULD BE IMPRESSED BY THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN CABINET HAD CONFIRMED TO US THAT INDIA'S POLICY WAS NOT TO EXPORT ITS TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW IN THIS AREA.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIAN EXPLOSION AND THE NPT, SWARAN SINGH SAID THAT INDIA HAD NOT SIGNED THE NPT BECAUSE IT WAS DISCRIMINATORY AND BECAUSE NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN DISARMAMENT. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE OF INDIA TO SIGN WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ACTIONS OF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS. AMBASSADOR ECKERBERG (SWEDEN) ASKED WHETHER INDIA MIGHT POSSIBLY SIGN THE TREATY IF THE NPT WERE AMENDED TO GIVE INDIA A SPECIAL STATUS (THAT OF A NUCLEAR STATE BUT NOT A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE) AND IF AN ADEQUATE REGIME FOR PROVIDING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS COULD BE DEVELOPED. SWARAN SINGH HEDGED, SAYING HE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO EXAMINE SUCH PROVISIONS, BUT THAT IN GENERAL, IF INDIA'S SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS WERE REMOVED, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY SIGN THE TREATY.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION ECKERBERG, MIHAJLOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) AND AMB ROSENBERG POLAK (NETHERLANDS) ALL AGREED THAT THE NPT REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY TALKING ABOUT ARTICLE V, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO AN ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURE FOR LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE. THEY FELT THAT IF THE TREATY COULD BE MADE ACCEPTABLE MANY OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT SIGN AND THAT THEREFORE THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE HAD TO INCLUDE ALL COUNTRIES THAT WERE AFFECTED. IT WAS ONLY IN THIS WAY, THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW, THAT ONE COULD GUARANTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04223 031732Z

THAT THE PRESENT NON-SIGNATORIES WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THE NEW NPT REGIME.

4. AMB MARTIN SOUGHT TO DISCOURAGE IDEA OF AMENDING NPT AND STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION OF AMENDING THE TREATY WAS IN ANY CASE COMPLETELY DISTINCT FROM THE SUBJECT OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. HE ADDED THAT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WAS A PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE

FORUM FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF ANY AMENDMENT. SWARAN SINGH
DID NOT CONTRADICT THIS COMMENT AND SAID THAT IT MIGHT
BE DIFFICULT FOR NON-SIGNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
REVIEW CONFERENCE BECAUSE, BY SO DOING, THEY MIGHT,
BY IMPLICATION, BE ACCEPTING PART OF THE PRESENT NPT
SYSTEM. DALE

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